ESSAY

CAN LAWYERS BE TRUSTED?*
SISSELA BOKt

I.

Two TYPES OF MORAL CONFLICT

I am honored to be speaking as an Owen J. Roberts Memorial
Lecturer, and to be doing so as perhaps the first emissary from the
field of philosophy. It is clear, however, from previous lectures that
philosophical questions have been centrally at issue from the beginning. This is not to be wondered at, since it is hard .to find a legal
issue that does not raise such questions-epistemological ones, perhaps, concerning what can and cannot be known, or moral ones having to do with what is right or wrong. What the British philosopher
Mary Midgley said of philosophy applies equally to legal analysis:
Philosophy, like speaking prose, "is something we have to do all our
lives, well or badly, whether we notice it or not. What usually forces
us to notice it is conflict."'
Among the reasons for public distrust of the legal profession is a
common perception that too many lawyers violate basic moral principles when it suits their purposes. This perception often conflates
two types of conflict that arise for lawyers. In both, lawyers confront
choices about observing common moral constraints such as those on
lying or the concealment of crimes; but in conflicts of the first type,
the primary motive is self-interest, whereas, in the second, it is the
interest of the client. About the first, there is little dispute in principle. Representatives of the bar agree with the public that lawyers
should not exempt themselves from common moral constraints for
the sake of personal gain, and codes of professional responsibility
reinforce that consensus.
* This Essay is an elaboration of the OwenJ. Roberts Memorial Lecture, which
the author delivered at the University of Pennsylvania on November 10, 1988.
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About the second type of conflict- between the lawyer's duty to
serve the client's interests and common moral constraints- there is
no such uniform agreement. Lawyers disagree among themselves
about where to draw the line with respect to certain forms of deception, to confidentiality about the criminal activities of their clients,
and to other forms of morally problematic behavior; and the lines
drawn by codes of professional responsibility are far from universally
endorsed even in principle, let alone always observed in practice.
Many in the public see the two types of conflict as linked. They
assume that lawyers who claim the right to violate common moral
constraints in order to serve their clients are merely rationalizing
what is in their own or the legal profession's collective self-interest.
But lawyers often regard the two types of conflict as profoundly different. In law, they argue, as in medicine and other professions, the
calling generates its own requirements that at times must override
ordinary moral constraints. It is only by adhering scrupulously to
these requirements that they truly deserve the trust of their clients
and thereby serve long-run societal interests.
Central to such debates are questions of confidentiality with
respect to clients who place third parties at risk.2 Health professionals, priests, and lawyers have long stressed the obligation to keep
what individuals confide to them secret. In most instances a guarantee of confidentiality poses no problem. Conflicts arise, however,
when what professionals keep secret misleads and thereby risks
harming others. The conflict is difficult enough when the secrets
concern past wrong-doing; it becomes even more severe when professional guidelines require confidentiality with respect to present or
future criminal activities.
Such is the case with the 1984 revision of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Most controversial is Model Rule 1.6, which
requires that lawyers not reveal client confidences about most
planned, even ongoing violations of the law. 3 As of 1987, a number
of the twenty-two states that had adopted versions of the Model
Rules had amended Model Rule 1.6 after considerable debate;
others had used it as a model. 4
2

For a discussion of these and other issues of confidentiality referred to in this

Lecture, see S. BoK,
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116-35 (1983).
Rule 1.6 (1983).
& W. HODES: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 865 (Supp. 1987). The authors note that Model Rule 1.6
"was by farthe most controversial focal point in the drafting and debate stages," and
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Controversy within the legal profession regarding such a rule
was to be expected, the more so because it represented a change in
the stance of the bar with respect to revealing crimes planned by
clients. Since 1908, the Canons of Professional Ethics, succeeded in
1970 by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, had permitted lawyers to reveal confidefices in order to prevent crimes contemplated by their clients.5
The new Rule was bound to add to existing public distrust of
lawyers. Arguably, the collective exemptions granted by the Rule
put lawyers in league not only with countless disparate crimes, but
with conspiracies of a magnitude that make bank robberies look like
petty theft by comparison. Critics regarded as bizarre the Rule's
delineation of only one circumstance under which lawyers may violate confidentiality about crimes planned by their clients: when disclosure is necessary to "prevent the client from committing a
criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm..

."'

These critics saw as equally

bizarre the phrasing of the Rule's exception so as to merely permit,
but not require, lawyers to disclose such plans of wrong-doing.
Confronted with such a narrow interpretation of a lawyer's
responsibility, commentators both inside and outside the legal profession might ask: what about a duty to report criminal plans in cases
where the victims will not otherwise be warned in time? What about
criminal conduct likely to result in deaths that are not "imminent"?
What about cases of ongoing child or spouse abuse, whether or not
such conduct risks killing victims or subjecting them to "substantial
bodily harm"? What about crimes causing grievous psychological
harm? What about financial fraud that can bankrupt unsuspecting
investors? What, finally, about the vast drug-trading and mofteylaundering schemes that span the globe and ultimately cause innumerable deaths?
Such questions will hardly be deflected by the unsubstantiated
and counterintuitive claims made in the comment to Model Rulel.6:
Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to
determine what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and
regulations, deemed to be legal and correct....
was "the most likely to be amended as each state put the final touches on its version
of the Model Rules." Id. at 855-56; see also D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN
ETHICAL STUDY 185 (1988).
5 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 37 (1908); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (c)(3) (1970).
6 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983).
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Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients
follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.7
Rhetoric of this kind merely reinforces the critics' distrust. They
see it as further evidence that lawyers guard their prerogatives, not
to uphold the noble goals they claim for their profession, but simply
to protect themselves and camouflage abuses from which they
benefit.
Yet it would be wrong to leap to the conclusion that there is
little or no difference between moral conflicts in which the motives
are primarily of a self-serving nature and those that involve a professional obligation to clients. The tension for lawyers between their
sense of professional duty and their awareness of the damage that
preserving a client's confidence can cause to third parties and to
public trust need contain no self-serving element. Often, that tension stems from a conflict between the moral constraints on betrayal
and excessive secrecy. These constraints, along with those on violence and deceit, are fundamental to the functioning of any society.
In turn, they play a central role in reducing distrust, whether it is
directed toward individuals, professions, or other collectivities.
II.

FUNDAMENTAL MORAL CONSTRAINTS

8

Violence and deceit are the two most important ways by which
human beings deliberately irjure one another. You can hurt someone as much through deceit as through violence; and deceit, being
surreptitious, often brings results that violence cannot muster. Consequently, every major religious, moral, or legal tradition has recognized the need for at least some restraints on both types of behavior.
No matter how different their social customs, religion, or attitudes
about sexual conduct, these traditions uniformly condemn force and
fraud-and, through them, the many forms of harm, such as theft
and torture, that people can do by means of one or both. True, societies have differed in how they define and delimit the forms of violence and deceit that they reject. Yet the universal insistence on firm
7 Id. at Rule 1.6 comment 3. See BOK, supra note 2, at 115, for a discussion of
how rationales justifying different practices of collective secrecy serve a double
function "as reasons that defend practices on grounds of fundamental human needs
such as trust and survival, but also as rationalizations that shield practices from
scrutiny."
8 The following few paragraphs are adapted from S. BOK, A STRATEGY FOR
PEACE 81-89 (1989).

1990]

CAN LAWYERS BE TRUSTED?

constraints on both speaks to the need for any community to keep
them within bounds.
A third fundamental moral constraint is likewise universally
stressed: that on betrayal, or going back on one's word. Promises,
vows, covenants, and laws therefore play a central role in most societies, as does the related virtue of trustworthiness. Whatever principles
one has promised to uphold, whatever laws one acknowledges, fidelity to them becomes essential; unless a principle or law is shown to
be invalid, breaching it constitutes betrayal.
Whether expressed in religious or secular form, these three values are shared by every civilization, past and present. Any community, no matter how small or disorganized, no matter how hostile
toward outsiders, no matter how cramped in its perception of what
constitutes, say, torture, has to impose at least some internal curbs on
violence, deceit, and betrayal in order to survive.
A fourth curb, on excessive secrecy, has been stressed in many
societies including our own. It is not as general and does not have
roots as ancient as the first three. On the contrary, secrecy has long
been a primary means of bringing about group cohesiveness and of
guarding against oppression and betrayal. But whenever secrecy
shields, or contributes to, violence, deceit, and breaches of promises
or of the law, it undercuts the first three constraints. The harm that
secrecy can then do is magnified when it is linked to the exercise of
power, whether by individuals, organizations, or governments. Like
deceit, secrecy protects abuses of power and in turn invites further
abuses.
This is why the constraint-not on secrecy in its own right, but
on excessive government secrecy-has been seen as so important for
democratic states.9 In the United States Constitution, as in the writings of the Enlightenment philosophers, the public's right to know is
regarded as fundamental to its capacity to exercise judgment and to
share in decision-making.
As our societies have become more complex and the powers of
professions, businesses, and other organizations have grown, they
too have increasingly been subjected to requirements of public
accountability. Like government agencies, however, these organizations also require a degree of secrecy, especially in the form of confidentiality, in order to maintain internal cohesion and function
effectively. As a result, conflicts over what constitutes excessive
9 See S. BoK, supra note 2, at 171-81.
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secrecy on their part have become as wrenching as those involving
0
government secrecy.1
Viewed in this light, it is easy to see why the controversy among
lawyers over the legal profession's present rules about confidentiality
continues unabated, and why these rules generate such distrust
among outsiders. The pubfic has little reason to trust practices of
professional secrecy that may conceal or contribute to violence,
deceit, and breaches of promises or law. Many lawyers feel correspondingly torn when their professional rules-and, in a number of
states, the law-require them to protect their clients' plans to commit preventable crimes.
Such conflicts are present, for instance, when an attorney representing a corporation cannot lawfully disclose, without the corporation's permission, confidences made by the chief executive officer
regarding fraudulent activities causing the company serious harm.
Likewise, attorneys representing firms planning to market a dangerously defective automobile, drug, or other consumer product have to
weigh whether to disclose confidential information regarding such
plans. It is not always clear that marketing such a product violates a
law. Even if it does and even if the product in question is life-threatening, the risk of death or of substantial bodily harm may not be
"imminent" as Model Rule 1.6 specifically requires to allow a violation of confidentiality, but rather constitute a risk to unknown victims
in the indefinite future. Quite apart from risks to life and limb, largescale corporate crime causes damage on a scale far vaster than that of
individual crime, challenging, each time, the limits of
confidentiality. "
When it comes to individual wrong-doing, the conflict that many
lawyers experience is acute whenever the suffering inflicted, even if it
is not life-threatening, is imminent, indeed on-going, for victims who
cannot speak for themselves. Thus, a lawyer may have a client who
reveals that he is unable to refrain from sexually abusing his small
children, yet insists on pressing a lawsuit to gain custody over them.
Often, however, the conflict is rendered murkier due to the difficulty
of ascertaining the facts in such situations. At times, attorneys
merely suspect sexual abuse; their clients, even if asked, will either
deny it or claim that they have stopped.
10 See id. at 102-280.
Ii For a discussion of how Model Rule 1.6 combines with Model Rule 1.13 in
such cases, see Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of
Corporate Counsel Disclosure, I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 299-305 (1987).
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A number of states now have reporting statutes that abrogate
the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality when child abuse is
suspected. In other jurisdictions, the privilege still prevents the
reporting of such suspicions. Still others, pursuant to the Model
Rules, permit but do not require lawyers to report if they suspect
that their client intends to commit future crimes of a life-threatening
nature.1 2 Similar variations obtain with respect to revealing client
confidences about corporate fraud and the marketing of dangerous
products.
Such varied requirements contribute to the uncertainty lawyers
have about their own responsibilities. Doubts about the facts surrounding many cases of suspected abuse and about how victims are
best protected compound the problem. From the point of view of
the victims, the resulting haphazard protection is clearly inadequate.
It is no consolation to hear lawyers explain that they keep such
secrets only reluctantly and strictly to serve their clients. It matters
little to the victims or to those concerned with their plight that lawyers claim to have no intention that anyone be harmed, and that, on
the contrary, they hope to dissuade their clients from unlawful
activities.
Nor are such claims reassuring to the public at large. The lack
of accountability for lawyers makes it impossible to assess responsibility for many avoidable tragedies. While the resulting public distrust sometimes may be misplaced, it is not easily stilled once it has
been awakened, least of all when it combines with the more general
distrust aroused by lawyers who violate moral and legal standards for
personal gain.
III. A BROADER

PERSPECTIVE

Might seeing the legal profession's ethical concerns in a broader
perspective permit a different approach to moral conflicts? One that
does not damage public trust by allowing or forcing lawyers to violate common moral standards? Such a broader perspective would
encourage lawyers and students of the law to weigh moral standards
more explicitly and to reconsider the role of the legal profession in
society.
By virtue of the power they exert, professionals cannot avoid
arousing a certain amount of cautious distrust. There is every reason
12 See Note, Child Abuse Reporting: A Challenge to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, I
GEO.J. LEGAL ETmics, 243, 247-49 (1987).
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not to add to it through any appearance of disregard for the common
good. The economist Kenneth Arrow has written of trust as a public
good that increases the efficiency of any system, but that cannot easily be bought: "If you have to buy it, you already have some doubts
about what you've bought."'" Albert Hirschman has further argued
that the supply of trust, as of other moral resources, may actually
increase through use but can become depleted and atrophy if not
used.

14

I would like to pursue this view of trust both as a public good
and as a moral resource by extending the analogy between the social
atmosphere-of which it is a crucial component-and our natural
atmosphere. 5 The social atmosphere may now be as much at risk as
the natural one. With respect to the latter, we witness the cumulative
damage to the earth's oceans and waterways, its atmosphere, even its
ozone layer from countless disparate activities. Consensus is growing that nations must combat this damage together in order to survive and that merely allowing present policies to continue invites
ecological disaster.
It is every bit as urgent to preserve the minimum of trust that is
the prime constituent of the social atmosphere in which all human
interaction takes place. To be sure, a measure of caution and distrust is indispensable in most human interaction. Pure trust is no
more conducive to survival in the social environment than is pure
oxygen in the earth's atmosphere. But too high a level of distrust
stifles efforts at cooperation as much as severe pollution impairs
health.
The economist Partha Dasgupta has recently argued that it is
because of the many ways in which trust among persons and agencies
is interconnected that it is such a fragile public commodity. For
instance, to the extent that government is less trusted, its capacity to
safeguard personal transactions and agreements will be more endangered. The same holds for the professions. "If [trust] erodes in any
part of the mosaic it brings down an awful lot with it." 16 The erosion
of trust is especially dangerous now that cooperative efforts to over13
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23 (1974). For a related view, see

Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers., 68 B.U.L. REV. 1, 18 (1988).
14 See Hirschman, Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of ComplicatingSome Categories
of Economic Discourse, 74 Am. EcON. REV. 89, 93 (1984).
15 This paragraph and the one following are adapted from S. BOK, supra note 8,
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come urgent social, economic, and environmental problems are
needed as never before; for these efforts will suffer to the degree that
trust is impaired. It matters greatly to society, therefore, that professionals see their activities in a larger social perspective. This
requires them to take the public good or moral resource of trust as
seriously as our natural resources, and to ask how their actions reinforce or impair trust.
It is equally important for the professions to ask that question
with respect to the effect of distrust on their own functioning within
the larger society. Professions, like all other groups, have to be able
to count on a minimum of trust in the social climate. Doubts about
the legal profession grow to the extent that any of its guidelines and
regulations are perceived as going against fundamental moral constraints in order, say, to protect clients who are themselves untrustworthy, perhaps dangerous. And when lawyers choose or are forced
to compromise their scruples by violating such constraints, their
trust in themselves can be shaken, both as persons capable of a consistent moral stance and as individuals worthy of trust on the part of
others. Some eventually set aside their doubts; others find themselves increasingly alienated from the profession. Law students
report experiencing such alienation; a number of those who leave
7
the profession give it as their reason.'
The distrust that perceived violations of fundamental moral constraints engender in victimized third parties and in the general public, moreover, combines with the distrust resulting from similar
violations on the part of public officials, health professionals, members of the financial community, and so many others. The cumulative damage to trust is daunting. The burden of proof, therefore,
must rest heavily on those who hold that lawyers or members of any
other profession should be free to act in ways that violate common
moral constraints. They should take into account not just the harm
they are then seen as inflicting on individuals but the damage to trust
as well.
This is not to say that professions will lose public trust if they
17 A recent poll by the Maryland State Bar Association documented a growing
dissatisfaction among many lawyers in the state and found that eighty percent of
those surveyed believed that an increasingly negative public view of the profession
was a main cause of lawyer dissatisfaction. See Maryland Lawyers' Attitudes, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 24, 1989, at B5, col.3. For a bibliography and a discussion of moral and
other reasons for lawyer dissatisfaction, see Holmes, Structural Causes of Dissatisfaction
Among Large Firm Attorneys: A Feminist Perspective, in WORKING PAPERS, SERIES 3,
INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL STUDIES (1988).
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invoke particular moral ideals or single out unusual traits of character as especially desirable. On the contrary, if the professions succeed in holding members to higher than ordinary standards of
competence and integrity, these differences will redound to their
credit. Trust is only at risk when professionals ask to be held less
accountable than others in regard to such standards.
Of the four fundamental moral constraints set forth above,
codes of professional responsibility hold lawyers to stringent standards with respect to those on deceit, violence, and breaches of
promises, contracts, and laws. But because these codes also call for a
level of secrecy denied to others, they undercut the moral constraint
on excessive secrecy and in turn tempt lawyers to violate the constraint on deceit in order to buttress confidentiality.
IV.

CONFIDENTIALITY, DECEIT AND TRUST

Beyond the moral legitimacy for individuals of keeping most
secrets and choosing with whom to share them, and beyond the
added obligation to keep confidences that a promise creates, lawyers
and certain other professionals, have special reasons to offer a strong
guarantee of confidentiality: without such a guarantee those in the
greatest need of help might withhold crucial information or forego
assistance entirely. As a result, confidentiality is in society's interests
as well as the client's. But it is unwise to conclude from these special
reasons that some insuperable barrier exists between personal and
professional duties of confidentiality with respect to factors that
render confidentiality dangerous in particular cases. Setting up such
a barrier jeopardizes public trust and risks corrupting the personal
moral standards of practitioners.
It is equally unwise to imagine that the moral principles of the
legal, or any other, profession derive from some unique source of its
own rather than from sources common to all of society.,' In the
18 William Simon argues that lawyers should have the discretion to decide
whether or not "assisting the client would further justice." Simon, EthicalDiscretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988). Doing so, he suggests, does not require
appealing to moral concerns outside the legal system against values associated with
the legal role. Rather, these values suffice to found ethical conduct by lawyers. Id. at
1083-84. He ultimately concedes, however, that his argument "simply takes for
granted that lawyers are substantially motivated to act ethically and that they have a
capacity for reasonably good normative judgment," and admits that the premises on
which he founds his arguments require debate in their own right. Id. at 1144. In his
discussion, Simon contrasts rule-making by the elite of the bar and decision-making
by the rank-and-file lawyer, arguing that it is not clear that one should have more
trust in the former than in the latter. Public distrust, however, is directed at both
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practice of law as in all other professions, any exceptions to common
moral principles should be few in number, capable of public justification, and subject to the strictest requirements of accountability.
Once these exceptions have been publicly granted, they can also be
publicly curtailed if they turn out to be exploited or injurious.
In weighing requests for such exceptions with respect to confidentiality, two kinds of cases that often overlap should receive special scrutiny: cases, such as those discussed above, where
confidentiality increases the risk of harm to third parties, and cases
where confidentiality involves or may slip into deceit.
Deceit by lawyers presents special dangers to trust. It exerts
power and brings about results by stealth that could not have been
achieved openly. To be sure, legal codes and guidelines rule out
deceit unequivocally. But effective enforcement is lacking; those
who suspect that deceit is at play have no way of ensuring that such
guidelines will be observed. Deceit is tempting, moreover, since it
comes so easily at first. One word spoken instead of another, a document backdated so as to deflect inquiry, a false claim made in the
process of negotiation, some figures altered in a tax documentthese neither call for the same physical effort nor arouse the same
immediate suspicion as, say, acts of violence. This ease makes lies
not only tempting but also peculiarly corrupting, especially as more
and more concealment and deception may seem needed to keep up a
false front.
The special dangers of deceit and the destructive impact it has
on trust whenever suspected necessitate strong rejection by any profession, going beyond guidelines to strive for broad support in everyday practice. Deceit for professional purposes should be granted
no special leeway-whether it be lying in court, forging or backdating documents, misleading clients about their chances of success, or
exaggerating about the reach of legitimate confidentiality to make
them more willing to confide their problems. To be sure, lawyers,
like others, may encounter exceptional crises in which a lie offers the
only alternative to save, say, an innocent life, and in which they are
certain that they will be able to justify their choice publicly once the
crisis is over. But there is nothing about being a lawyer which adds
legitimacy to such choices.
Ruling out deceit is easiest when it already constitutes a clear
groups. Thus, the necessary accountability cannot be achieved if either group is
simply assumed to be ethically well-motivated and capable of adequate moral
reasoning.
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violation of the law. It is equally important, however, to ensure that
lawyers consider the many times when opportunities to deceive arise
in circumstances where the law is silent or where lies are unlikely to
be discovered. Such practices are sufficiently fluid and difficult to
detect so that each lawyer's self-respect, sense of integrity, and concern for the reputation of the legal profession must, in the end, present the strongest barrier. It is helpful, for this purpose, to compare
different models of professional integrity in these respects and to
stress ways of reasoning through common moral conflicts, not only
in law schools but in professional contexts at all levels of legal
careers.
Cicero spoke of the links between personal integrity and truthfulness in On Duties, 9 written for his son Marcus in 43 B.C. At the
time Cicero knew that he would soon be arrested and killed for his
outspoken political views on behalf of the Roman Republic which he
had seen collapse. Intrigue and corruption were everywhere around
him. He wanted to remind his son of the virtues, or excellences of
character, without which corruption and injustice were bound to
grow in Rome or any other nation. For courage and greatness of
soul to be genuine, he wrote, they must be accompanied by wisdom
and justice. He added: "And so we demand that men who are courageous and high-souled shall at the same time be good and straightforward, lovers of truth and foes to deception; for these qualities are
the centre and soul of justice." '20
Because even lawyers who regard themselves as generally trustworthy may be led into practices of manipulation and falsehood by
the felt need to keep their clients' secrets, the need for careful discussion of such cases is great. Ideally, students should encounter,
early on, opportunities to consider alternatives to underhanded
practices, so as not to be caught by surprise and slip into them by
default.
In the course of weighing alternatives, it is necessary to ask
which forms of secrecy are inherently deceptive. Prominent among
these is silence regarding information one has a duty to convey.
Consider, for example, a lawyer who urges a client to accept a guilty
plea and who does not disclose, or sufficiently emphasize, a possibility of obtaining a favorable verdict. The failure to inform the client
about the possibility of a favorable verdict misleads the client as
much as falsely claiming that there is no such possibility. The same
19 CICERO, DE OFFICIIS (W. Miller trans. 1913).
20

Id. at 65.
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is true when lawyers who represent clients in tax matters or in business negotiations conceal facts that they have a duty to reveal.
With such distinctions clearly in mind, a person can be a lover of
truth and a foe to deception, in Cicero's words, and still keep secrets
when it is right to do so. Whereas all deceit is prima facie wrong and
requires strong justification, the same is not true for secrecy. When
it is deceptive, it is as illegitimate as outright falsehood. In other
instances, however, such as the protection of unpublished drafts or
the sealing of wills, secrecy can be entirely legitimate.
Such a view of deceit and secrecy can help lawyers avoid many
conflicts between their professional responsibility and their own
moral integrity. Stressing shared moral constraints places such questions in larger societal perspective-one that weighs factors that
affect trust more generally within and between societies, rather than
merely the trust on the part of clients. It also requires recognition of
the cumulative impact of social conditions in which ever growing
legions of lawyers undertake increasingly complex transactions and
in which the practices of banking, policing, governing, and the media
add to the conflicts over confidentiality. Moral constraints have
always been relevant to the atmosphere of trust; but now the cumulative effect of both large-scale and seemingly trivial breaches add a
measure of urgency to all efforts at preventing damage to that
atmosphere.
Just as countless industries, groups, and individuals contribute
to polluting the earth's atmosphere, they also affect the social climate
of trust through innumerable practices. It is therefore urgent for
governments, professions, communities, and individuals to ask to
what extent their actions worsen or improve the climate needed for
effective cooperation. Because the professions play such a central
role in that endeavor and have such a large stake in its outcome, they
have every reason to reexamine professional roles in the light of fundamental moral constraints and of their contributions to the common good.
This process is already under way in many states through committees on professional ethics and other forums. For example, there
is now increasing debate over whether lawyers should be allowed, or
required, to report ongoing practices of child abuse by their clients.
In a number of states, the question has been resolved by placing
more restrictive limits on confidentiality. 2
21

See Note, supra note 12, at 243-66.
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THREE ARGUMENTS AGAINST CHANGE

There are three important and familiar cautions with respect to
implementing such a broadened perspective on legal ethics. The
first one asks whether doing so will not weaken the bond of full trust
between lawyers and clients. A second envisages risks to the legal
system, and in turn to society, from enlarging the domain of a lawyer's responsibility as currently conceived.2 2 A third argues that
even if such changes present no great risks in their own right, the
mere possibility of change might set the legal profession on a slippery slope leading inexorably to further, less desirable changes.
The first argument concerns potential damage to trust between
lawyers and their clients resulting from the changes to the privilege
of confidentiality that a new perspective on legal ethics might
encourage. It is based on predictions of an empirical nature: clients
will disclose less to their lawyers if they cannot count on full secrecy
to protect even their most egregious plans for wrong-doing. If, for
example, clients engaged in domestic abuse or fraudulent financial
activities cannot expect their lawyers to keep such secrets, the argument goes, then the mutual confidence and trust that ideally should
characterize their relationship will evaporate. As a result, clients may
no longer provide lawyers with the information needed to provide
effective representation and facilitate attempts to discourage criminal
conduct.
This line of argument should not preclude all reforms of the
present rules concerning confidentiality for several reasons. In the
first place, the empirical predictions may be erroneous. It would
seem rational for persons contemplating continued wrong-doing to
weigh the risks of revealing such plans to their lawyers against the
risks of receiving poor guidance stemming from not informing them
fully. It may well be that many clients would assess the first set of
risks more highly than the second and thus choose to reveal less to
their lawyers. Others may make the reverse assumption and be more
open, as a result, to pressure from their lawyers to abandon their
plans rather than have them revealed to third parties. There is no
persuasive body of evidence to show that clients would choose to
inform lawyers less adequately were the present rules less protective
of confidentiality. 2 3 Nor has it been demonstrated that clients at
22

This domain has not always been as narrowly circumscribed in English and

American law as it is today. See Hazard, An HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1069-91 (1978).
23 Indeed some argue that the reverse may often be the case:

1990]

CAN LAWYERS BE TRUSTED?

present make such choices regarding plans for criminal conduct
endangering human life, even though lawyers are already at liberty
to report what they learn about such plans.
Second, even if clients did decide to withhold information about
planned criminal conduct, many lawyers might prefer the resulting
freedom from perceived complicity in crime. One commentator has
argued that the "promise of complicity in serious wrong-doing is too
high a price to pay for a chance to be let in on [a client's] intention to
24
commit it.",

Third, it may even be that the clients might envisage fewer
rather than more crimes if they were not able to count on the silerce
of their legal advisers. Again, however, no solid empirical evidence
supports speculation either way, in part because the very effort to
conduct research on such choices would present problems of confidentiality between the researchers and their subjects.
What, however, if it were to be shown that many more individuals, perhaps even some with no criminal plans whatsoever, might be
discouraged from seeking legal advice by changes in requirements
concerning confidentiality? In that case, the risks to them from such
a loss of trust still have to be weighed against factors such as the
protection of the prospective victims of such criminal plans as well
as the more general damage to trust from existing legal practices.
As long as lawyers base their defense of strict confidentiality on
the social benefits of such a policy, there is every reason to make sure
that those benefits are demonstrable and not outweighed by the
harm such policies make possible. Merely allowing lawyers to withdraw from a distasteful case, while requiring continued silence, does
allow them to make partial peace with their consciences; but it does
nothing to prevent harm to third parties or to public trust.
The objection is sometimes made that lawyers would have to
issue "Miranda warnings" to their clients if breaches of confidentiality were permitted for larger categories of ongoing and future
People would have ample incentives to disclose adverse information to
counsel even without confidentiality safeguards because they are honest
and law-abiding, because they cannot make reliable judgments about

when it is in their interest to withhold, or because in many business
contexts they risk liability by failing to seek good legal advice .... More

dramatically even sophisticated people often volunteer self-inculpatory
information to the police after Miranda warnings, apparently from a natural
compulsion to vindicate themselves.
Simon, supra note 18, at 1142.
24 Goldman, Confidentiality, Rules, and Codes of Ethics, 3
8, 14 (1984).
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crimes, and that such a warning would inhibit free and uninhibited
communication.2 5 This objection would stand on firmer ground if
there were not already cerrain exceptions to complete confidentiality. Clearly, the question of how to inform clients has to arise as
soon as there is any exception whatsoever. Thus, enlarging the category of exceptions presents nothing new in terms of "warning" clients. "Miranda warnings," moreover, are only needed if it is
otherwise assumed that lawyers do preserve full confidentiality. In
the absence of rules or laws to that effect, few people could reasonably make such an assumption in the case of a present or future
crime.
The second group of arguments against a broader perspective
on legal ethics and the resulting possibility for change is even more
speculative than the first. These arguments address the risks to the
legal profession and to society at large, rather than to the relationship between clients and lawyers. They contend that the social system functions best when lawyers and other professionals look
narrowly to fulfilling their appointed tasks.
Thus, some claim that the much-invoked adversary system of law
functions most efficiently and fairly if all participants simply carry out
their roles to the best of their ability, rather than seeking to promote
justice through their actions.2 6 Others make the same arguments for
doctors or scientists and conclude by urging those professionals to
do what they do best, rather than pausing to worry about the ultimate results of their activities or even, as in the case of atomic physicists, about the survival of humanity.
By their very nature, such arguments are difficult to prove or
disprove. In part, their elusiveness stems from an underlying metaphysical assumption that someone or some process, independent of
the discordance among participants, will set everything to rights.
This force may be the judge or the jury in trials where lawyers on
each side strive to present conflicting claims; it may be an invisible
hand, operating perhaps through the workings of the market; it may
be the unfolding of history--inscrutable to us but understood in retrospect as having a direction; or it may be Nature or Providence.
According to such metaphysical assumptions, the system works best
when individual members act as their role demands without worrying
Note, supra note 12, at 260.
For discussions of the adversary system, see generally A.

25 See
26
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about the overall picture. The prime temptation is seen as that of
"playing God" by trying to improve on the disarray out of which
order is destined to come. Consequently, those who experience a
conflict between integrity and professional obligations can and
should allow the latter to override their qualms of conscience in the
certainty that a system where everyone does so will, in the end, work
out for the best.
The British philosopher F.H. Bradley explored this metaphysical
claim and the moral conclusions many have drawn from it in his
essay "My Station and Its Duties.",2 7 He saw the human world as an
organic whole, and history as the "working out of the true human
nature through various incomplete stages towards completion.... 28 Meanwhile, each individual and each profession has a
"station" that prescribes certain duties. We cannot and should not
hold ourselves uniquely responsible for promoting the good of what
lies outside of our domain. Bradley did not go so far as to claim that
there could be no argument about these duties, however, or that they
could never collide with common moral standards. In a corrupt society, for example, professional duties might be so twisted that they
have to be overridden. But ordinarily, "a man who does his work in
the world is good, notwithstanding his faults, if his faults do not pre29
vent him from fulfilling his station."
Such a view offers a rationale for overriding the conflict between
one's conscience and one's professional or other group role. But it
rests on two assumptions, neither of which is as self-evident today as
when nineteenth century theorists posited "my station and its
duties," the "invisible hand," or "the march of history." The
assumptions are, first, that an underlying order capable of setting all
to rights does in fact prevail; and second, that it will persist-that the
story, in a sense, has no foreseeable end.
These assumptions about order and continuity are now increasingly questioned. Economists agree, for example, that markets cannot always be expected to operate flawlessly in all circumstances and
that intervention is therefore required at times if financial catastrophe is to be avoided. Observers of international relations warn that
we cannot count on continuity even with respect to human survival,
given the nuclear threat. And when it comes to the natural environ27 F.H. BRADLEY, Essay V, in ETHICAL STUDIES 160 (1927); see also D. LUBAN, supra
note 4, at 57 (discussion of this view in the context of legal ethics).
28 F.H. BRADLEY, supra note 27, at 192.
29

Id. at 181.
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ment, the folly of past assumptions about order and continuity is
becoming increasingly clear; these assumptions have prevented past
generations from seeing the proportions of man-made threats to our
common natural resources and, now, to human survival. As a result,
many of the scientists and industrial leaders who not long ago
adhered to the view that all they needed to do was theirjob have now
come to accept a much greater sense of responsibility for how their
actions affect human prospects.
Lawyers and other professionals are also increasingly examining
their role in contributing to such developments. There is every reason for professionals to ask about the risks of damage not only to the
natural environment, but also to the social environment. Even as the
legal profession performs an indispensable role in society, its practitioners must consider how best to avoid functioning as free riders
with respect to the scarce resource of trust without which fragile
social institutions cannot flourish. In any such examination, the conflicts lawyers experience concerning the moral constraints on deception and excessive secrecy should occupy a central place, given their
damage to trust.
It is at this point, however, that yet a third argument arises. Proponents of this argument might grant, at least for the sake of discussion, the inadequacy of both the empirical and the metaphysical
arguments against enlarging the scope of legal ethics. Even so, they
might caution against the changes that such a broadening of perspective would require by warning of the slippery slope on which the
legal profession might then have embarked.
Arguments that warn of a slippery slope, or the entering edge of
the wedge, or the camel's nose under the tent are in constant use in
advocacy. They oppose a proposed change by pointing to potential
future risks."0 For example, opponents of legalizing abortion have
argued that, little by little, such a change will make possible infanticide and large-scale euthanasia. 3 ' Likewise, advocates of holding the
line on confidentiality in the lawyer-client relationship argue that it
keeps lawyers from having to reveal more and more about their clients and, in the end, coming to serve as informers. Holding the line
more generally on a narrow interpretation of the role for lawyers in
society, the argument goes, will protect them from the temptation to
30 See Bok, The Leading Edge ,f the Wedge, in THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 9
(Dec. 1971).
31 See THE MORALITY OF ABORTION (J. Noonan ed. 1970). For a discussion of
such arguments with respect to abortion see Bok, Ethical Problems of Abortion, in THE
HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES IN ETHICS 50-51 (1974).
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sacrifice the interests of a client whenever doing so might thereby
advance whatever religious or political ideology the attorney happens to espouse.
The risks to which slippery slope or wedge arguments point are
possible abuses which might result from the spread of a relatively
narrow exception to encompass larger categories, and of the deterioration of attitudes that might then ensue. Such arguments are often
rhetorical in nature, cautioning against risks that are unlikely to arise
and against which safeguards exist. But there are other times when
the caution is entirely justified, as in the case of experimentation with
highly addictive drugs or of making inroads on human rights. Such
arguments should never be dismissed out of hand. Rather, they have
to be examined with a view to the specific context that they address.
At bottom, slippery slope arguments concern conflicts over
where to draw a particular line: should it remain where it is or be
redrawn? These arguments rely on two implicit assumptions that
may or may not be warranted in specific sets of circumstances.
According to the first assumption, there already exists a line that is
clearer and more legitimate than the proposed new line would be.
The second assumption holds that the contemplated change risks
highly undesirable results because forces such as addiction, racism,
zealotry, or greed will cause the process of change to continue, once
it has been initiated. That is what makes the slope such a slippery
one. If there is a chance that the dangerous development will be
irreversible, this second assumption is strengthened.
Asking whether these assumptions are warranted helps to distinguish between the many guises of the slippery slope or wedge argument. With respect to enlarging the exceptions to attorney-client
confidentiality, the first assumption-that the existing line is clearer
and more legitimate than any new line would be-does not hold.
The present line is far from universally accepted in different jurisdictions. It might be clearer if it allowed for no exceptions whatsoever;
but in that case, it would be patently less legitimate. It would then,
for instance, prevent a lawyer from revealing a client's plan to assassinate a head of state. In fact, of course, the present rules do allow
for exceptions that include planned murder. There is no reason to
believe that redrawing the line to give it added legitimacy need make
it less clear.
With respect to the second assumption that forces will press
toward highly undesirable results once the existing line has been
shifted, caution is indeed called for. Efforts to increase accountability and concern on the part of lawyers regarding the potential victims
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of their clients and the degree of trust directed toward their profession should also stress safeguards to prevent these shifts from
becoming open-ended. But caution is equally needed, I have
argued, against the forces in all professions pressing for stronger
confidentiality rules, with countervailing undesirable results. In
either case, the task is one of encouraging debate about professional
standards, of considering how to make use of sanctions and inducements to guard against possible dangers, and of making provisions
to reverse the change should early signs appear that an undesirable
trend is under way.
The slippery slope argument against expanding the exceptions
to rules about confidentiality is therefore not persuasive in its own
right. Like the other two sets of arguments mentioned above, it is
worth taking seriously; and the risks of which each warns should be
kept in mind as possible changes are debated. But the debate itself, I
have suggested-in law schools and professional associations as well
as in the political forum-will benefit from a society-wide perspective
on the role of the legal profession.
InJune, 1914, President Woodrow Wilson conveyed the essence
of such a perspective to a graduating class in Annapolis. He urged
his listeners not to develop what he called "the professional point of
view":
I would ask it of you if you were lawyers; I would ask it of you if you
were merchants; I would ask it of you whatever you expected to be.
Do not get the professional point of view. There is nothing narrower or more unserviceable than the professional point of view, to
have the attitude toward life that it centers in your profession. It
does not. Your profession is only one of the many activities .... 32
Wilson, who was himself trained in the law, hardly meant to
impugn the ideals of the different professions or their traditions of
reflection about moral responsibilities. Rather, he wanted the graduates in his audience to take seriously, from the very outset of their
careers, the thought that their profession "is only one of the many
activities" that make up a functioning society. His injunction may
sound deflating at first. But the full implications of such a view offer
opportunities for lawyers to overcome some of the most difficult con32 Address by President Woodrow Wilson to Graduating Class of the United
States Naval Academy (June 5, 1914), reprinted in I THE NEW DEMOCRACY:
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND OTHER PAPERS (1913-1917) BY WOODROW

WILSON 126, 127 (R. Baker & W. Dodd, eds. 1926).
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flicts between duties to clients and the public good-thus honoring
the highest ideals of the legal profession.

